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I.

INTRODUCTION

Commenters have lamented the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell v.
United States.1 Yet, absent from the discussion of McDonnell’s impact is acknowledgement of the
potential hypocrisy such an opinion has created in the DOJ’s effort to combat corruption both
domestically and abroad. Through McDonnell, The United States Supreme Court has made it
difficult to prosecute political corruption within this country. 2 In the meantime, our own legislature
has made it relatively easy to prosecute Americans involved in similar corruption practices
overseas through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 3
Now, thanks to the Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonnell, some of the same conduct that is
legal under McDonnell is illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. This comment will
compare the current state of domestic bribery law post-McDonnell, with the law governing FCPA
prosecutions, eventually concluding that conduct potentially prosecutable that occurs abroad is
deemed lawful when it occurs domestically. This enforcement gap is a largely ignored
consequence of McDonnell, but one which threatens to undermine government efforts to
discourage domestic bribery, while also prosecuting foreign bribery.

1

Alan Feur, Why Are Corruption Cases Crumbling? Some Blame The Supreme Court , N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/nyregion/menendez-seabrook-corruption-cases-crumbling-.html
2 In McDonnell v. United States, the United States Supreme Court m ade it more difficult to prosecute domestic
bribery through their narrow reading of the official act standard in 18 U.S.C. 201. Eric Lipton & Benjamin Weiser,
Supreme Court Complicates Corruption Cases From New York to Illinois, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/politics/supreme-court-complicates-corruption-cases-from-new-york-toillinois.html
3 Mike Koehler, FOREIGN C ORRUPT PRACTICE ACT STATISTICS, THEORIES, POLICIES AND B EYOND, 65 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 157 (2017).
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Section II of this comment will explore 18 U.S.C. § 201, the Federal Bribery statute at issue in
McDonnell. This section will examine the differences between 18 U.S.C. § 201’s interpretation of
the official act standard pre- and post-McDonnell. This analysis of the pre- and post-McDonnell
landscape will show that the Supreme Court’s ruling radically changed how prosecutors charge
and convict those who engaged in bribery while in office.
Section III of this comment will discuss the application of McDonnell, particularly analyzing
whether Courts have determined if the official act standard applies to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. In examining the application of McDonnell with regards to the FCPA, this comment will
analyze the Second Circuit’s United States v. Seng decision. In Seng, the Second Circuit concluded
that McDonnell does not impact FCPA prosecutions.
With Seng considered, Part IV of this comment will explore instances where a politician’s
actions, which would now be considered lawful under McDonnell, could be illegal under the FCPA
if they instead related to a foreign official, instead of an American politician. This comment will
conclude by suggesting that the legislature re-draft the portion of 18 U.S.C § 201 that involves
domestic bribery to conform with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act so not to allow activity we
deem illegal abroad to occur unchecked in the United States.
II.

BACKGROUND
a. 18 U.S.C. § 201: A Federal Prosecutor’s Roadmap to Proving Domestic Bribery of
Public Officials
Section 201 of Title 18 is entitled “Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses”. 4 This statute

criminalizes the receipt of bribes for those “acting for or on the behalf of the United States.” 5

4
5

18 U.S. Code § 201.
Id.
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Essentially, Section 201 makes it a crime for a public official to directly or indirectly demand,
seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept anything of value in exchange for being
influenced in the performance of an official act. 6 Section 201 of Title 18 however is comprised of
two distinct offenses, and in common parlance only the first of these is true “bribery”. 7
More specifically, the first offense, codified in section 201(b), prohibits the giving or
accepting of anything of value to or by a public official, if the thing is given with the intent to
influence an official act, or if it is received by the official in return for being influenced. 8 Similarly,
Section 201(c) prohibits a public official from accepting the thing of value, if he does so for or
because of any official act.9
An essential part of the statute is thus what constitutes an official act because an action
violates the statute is if is given to influence the performance of an official act. 10 Within the statute
an official act is defined as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding
or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any
public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.” 11

6

Id.
The two offenses codified in 18 U.S. Code differ § 201 differ slightly. These differences converge on how close a
connection there is between the giving (or receiving) of the thing of value, on the one hand, the doing of the official
act, on the other. If the connection is direct (i.e. money was given to ensure an official a ct was committed) the crime
is bribery and section 201(b)(1) and (2) were violated. On the other hand, if the connection was looser (i.e. money
was given after an official act was taken as a thank you) the action is considered a gratuity, which is charged under
section 201(c). This comment will focus on the bribery aspect of the statute. The United States Department of
Justice Criminal Resources Manual, BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS (available at:
https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2041-bribery-public-officials ) (Last updated January 17,
2020).
8 Id. The United States Department of Justice Criminal Resources Manual, B RIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS (available
at: https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2041-bribery-public-officials )
9 The United States Department of Justice Criminal Resources Manual, Bribery of Public Officials (available at:
https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2041-bribery-public-officials )
10 18 U.S. Code § 201
11 §201(a)(3).
7
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Though prosecutors usually do not charge public officials under 18 U.S.C. § 201 12 , all
public corruption prosecutions involve proving that a public official performed an "official act,"
and courts turn to the official act definition in the bribery statute, § 201(a)(3), as discussed above.
Therefore, to understand the full extent of 18 U.S.C. § 201 it becomes useful to know what the
official act standard was before McDonnell because this standard greatly influenced what did and
did not constitute an illegal bribe in domestic prosecutions. Understanding this change will show
just how monumental the McDonnell decision was in the domestic bribery sphere.
b. The Pre-McDonnell Landscape: A Court That is Slowly Eroding Corruption Cases
In the last two decades, the United States Supreme Court has slowly eroded the country’s body
of corruption laws, through an endorsement of the criminalization of politics critique. 13 The
criminalization of politics critique states that prosecuting state and local corruption has been
assumed by United States Attorneys, who have at their disposal an array of broadly worded bribery
statutes.14 Proponents of the criminalization critique argue that this combination can become
dangerous, leading to partisan prosecutions brought by politically motivated prosecutors. 15 The
criminalization critique goes on that these very tools are being used against political practices that
are essential to representative government.16 Therefore, instead of improving the government these

Section 201 criminalizes the receipt of bribes on the part of federal officials, but is limited to those “acting for or
on behalf of the United States.” In addition, 201 does not have the inherent “honest services” aspect so prosecutors
will often charge those who are public officials under 18 U.S.C. § 1346. See Craig A. Raabe & Sean Johnston, It’s a
Matter of Bribery, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar.–Apr. 1999
13 Deborah Hellman, A Theory of Bribery, 38 Cardozo L. Rev. 1947 (Aug. 2017). See e.g., George Brown,
M CDONNELL AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS, 5 Va. J. Crim. L. 2; McDonnell and the Criminalization of
Politics, Matt Zapotosky, The Bob McDonnell effect, WASH. POST (July 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-bob-mcdonnell-effect-the-bar-is-getting-higher-toprosecute-public-corruption-cases/2017/07/13/5ac5745c-67e6-11e7-992822d00a47778f_story.html?utm_term=.4da363868d98 [https://perma.cc/M3PM -LF9Z] ("A federal appeals court's
decision to overturn the convictions of former New York State Assembly speaker Sheldon Silver shows how public
corruption cases have become much more difficult to substantiate in the wake of a Supreme Court decision
narrowing what qualifies as corruption . . . .")
14 Brown, supra note 13.
15 See genera lly NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 167-71, 280-90 (6th ed. 2015).
16 Brief for American Center for Law and Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting
12
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prosecutions are undermining it.17 The criminalization of politics critique has gained traction over
the years.18 Through this shift, the bar has been raised when it comes to prosecuting politicians
accused of dabbling in suspicious behavior.19 In fact, the Court’s actions in the past two decades
lending credence to this critique have had real consequences, resulting in what now closely
resembles a prosecutorial inability to challenge public corruption. 20
Before McDonnell, the last time the Supreme Court addressed this bribery statute was in
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California.21 In Sun-Diamond, the Court required the
prosecution to prove a quid pro quo – that something of value was given in exchange for an official
act.22 In the case, Sun-Diamond was a trade association that engaged in marketing and lobbying
activities on behalf of its members.23 The government alleged Sun-Diamond gave the United States
Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy illegal gifts in violation of the federal gratuities statute. 24
The Supreme Court considered the question of whether a conviction under the illegal
gratuity statute required any showing beyond the fact that a gratuity was given because of the
recipient’s official position.25 The Court held that in order to prove a violation under the statute,
the Government needed to show a link between the thing of value conferred upon a public official
and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it was given. 26 In essence, the Court found that

Petitioner, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).
17 Brown, supra note 13.
18 See, e.g., Edwin M. Yoder, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE C RIMINALIZATION OF POLITICS, 43 St. Louis U. L.J. 749
(1999) (discussing post-Watergate "reforms" that have led to the criminalization of normal political behavior)
19 Id.
20 See generally Harvey Silverglate and Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDonnell Fails to Draw a Clear
Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2016 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 189; Alan Feur, Why Are Corruption Cases
Crumbling? Some Blame The Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/17/nyregion/menendez-seabrook-corruption-cases-crumbling-.html
21 526 U.S., 405 401 (1999).
22 Id.
23 The members of the Sun Diamond Trade Association were growers of raisins, figs, walnuts, prunes, and
hazelnuts. Id.
24 Among these gifts were tickets to the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament, luggage, meals, and other expensive gifts,
totaling approximately $6,000 in illegal gratuities. Id.
25 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. at 401.
26 Id. at 413.
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merely giving gifts to a public official to “build a reservoir of goodwill” that might ultimat ely
affect one or more of a multitude of unspecified acts, would not support a gratuities conviction
under this statute.27
Sun Diamond was one of the first indicators of the criminalization of politics critique
coming to life in the Court’s dismantling of federal public corruption cases. 28 Now, prosecutors
needed to show a link between the thing of value being given and an official act being performed.29
After Sun-Diamond it was no longer enough for the prosecution to allege that the gift was given
to build goodwill with a public official in hopes that he or she would remember that gift when
voting on legislation or drafting prohibition.30 It has been suggested that the Court made this
determination because it was worried about setting a dangerous precedent in public corruption
cases, once again highlighting the aforementioned criminalization of politics critique at the
forefront of this movement.31 In its articulation of this criminalization of politics critique, the Court
worried that if these gifts could be criminalized, could all else token gifts also be criminalized as
a result?32
In Sun-Diamond, the Court took away some of the government’s ability to prosecute
politicians for accepting minor gifts given to them by businesses, potentially signaling that there
was more to come.33 The Court did not, however, address what constitutes an official act under
the statute, and this ambiguity became the primary issue in McDonnell v. United States.34

27

Id.
Brown, supra note 13.
29 Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414.
30 Jacob Eisler, M CDONNELL AND ANTI -C ORRUPTION'S LAST STAND, 50 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1619, 1637 (2017).
31 George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us - Salinas, Sun-Diamond, and Two Views of the Anticorruption
Model, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 747, 751-56 (2000)
32 Id. at 413.
33 Professor Teachout regards Sun-Diamond as a significant case with extensive ramifications stating that it states
that "it set the table for the Court” in many upcoming decisions. Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America: From
Benjamin Franklin's Snuff Box to Citizens United (2014) at 229.
34 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016).
28

6

III.

MCDONNELL V. UNITED STATES: NEW TERRAIN IN FEDERAL CORRUPTION
LAW
McDonnell v. United States drastically changed the standard for prosecuting public

officials engaged in domestic bribery. 35 In 2014, Governor Robert McDonnell of Virginia was
indicted for accepting payments, loans, gifts, and other things of value from a wealthy Virginia
businessman, Johnnie Williams (“Williams”), and his company (“Star Scientific”) in exchange for
acting on an as-needed basis, and as opportunities arose, to legitimate, promote and obtain research
studies for Star Scientific’s products.36
McDonnell was charged with Honest Services Fraud 37 and Hobbs Act Extortion38 for
accepting these lavish gifts from Williams.39 As mentioned, the theory underlying both the honest
services fraud and the Hobbs Act Extortion charges was that McDonnell accepted bribes from
Williams in exchange for assisting Williams in promoting his company’s products. 40 Though
McDonnell was not being tried under 18 U.S.C. § 201, both parties to the action stipulated that the
bribery at issue in the case needed to be defined by this statute. 41 Specifically, the stipulation meant
that the jury would need to determine if McDonnell committed “official acts” as defined under 18
U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) in return for William’s favors. 42 Therefore, in order to convict McDonnell, the

35

Chris Cillizza, The Bob McDonnell Supreme Court Ruling Makes Convicting Politicians of Corruption Almost
Impossible, WASH. POST (June 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/06/27/the-bobmcdonnell-scotus-ruling-proves-that-its-al most-impossible-to-convict-politicians-of-corruption/?utm
term=.022989fcd793
36 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016). (quoting Supp. App. 46).
37 To be guilty of violating the honest services fraud statute one must owe a duty of honest service to someone and
have deprived that person, or that person’s entity of the duty owed by accepting a bribe or kickback from another
person. 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Add another sentence or two about this regularly being used to prosecute politicians and
those bribing them.
38 The Hobbs Act prohibits public officials from obtaining property “under color of official right” or using their
position of authority to extort property. 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
39 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Though not referenced by the Court, 18 U.S.C. 666 also prohibits bribery of state officials. Id.
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government needed to prove that the Governor committed, or agreed to commit, an official act in
exchange for the loans and gifts he received from Williams. 43
To prove its case, the government asserted the McDonnell violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)
when he accepted loans and gifts in exchange for various favors he did for Williams. Specifically
the government alleged that McDonnell committed at least 5 official acts. These acts consisted of:
1) Arranging meetings for Williams with Virginia government officials, who were subordinates of
the Governor, to discuss and promote one of the drugs Williams was trying to promote: Anatabloc;
2) Hosting events at the Governor’s mansion designed to encourage Virginia university researchers
to pursue Star Scientific’s research; 3) Contacting other government officials in the [Governor’s
Office] as part of an effort to encourage Virginia state research universities to initiate studies of
anatabine; 4) Promoting star Scientific’s products and facilitating its relationships with Virginia
government officials by allowing [Williams] to invite individuals important to Star Scientific’s
business to exclusive events at the Governor’s mansion and 5) Recommending that senior
government officials in the [Governor’s Office] meet with Star Scientific executives to discuss
ways that the company’s products could lower healthcare costs. 44 The District Court gave the
government’s proposed jury instruction, which stated that an official act included “acts that a
public official customarily performs including those acts “in furtherance of longer-term goals” or
“in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end.” 45 After deliberating, the jury
convicted Governor McDonnell on Honest Services Fraud and Hobbs Act Extortion Counts. 46

43

Id.
Id.
45 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366.
46 Id. at 2367. This comment does not discuss the other elements of McDonnell’s appeal rejected by the Fourth
Circuit and not taken up by the Supreme Court.
44
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The Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed this judgment, rejecting McDonnell’s central
argument that the District Court’s definition of “official act” was too broad. 47 In his appeal
McDonnell argued that the trial court’s jury instructions were overtly broad and would render
“virtually all of a public servant’s activities ‘official,’ no matter how minor or innocuous.” 48 The
Fourth Circuit rejected this argument holding that when "when prosecuting a bribe recipient, the
Government need only prove that he or she solicited or accepted the bribe in return for performing,
or being influenced in, some particular official act” the official act does not need to be completed
in order to convict.49 The court continued that to the extent McDonnell made “any decision or took
any action on these matters, the federal bribery laws intended those decisions and actions to be
official.50 The court concluded that the government met its burden in showing that McDonnell
made a dishonest agreement with Williams and used the power of his position to influence
decisions about research into Williams’s drug Anatabloc.51 After the Fourth Circuit’s decision
affirming the District Court’s broad definition of the official act standard, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, signaling to court watchers the Court may continue to limit the legal scope of
what it considers public corruption.52
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, and determined
that McDonnell had not committed any official acts. 53 In doing so, the Court created a two-part
test to determine if an action constituted an official act under 18 U.S.C. § 201, holding that in order

McDonnell, 792 F.3d, 478, 520 (4 th Cir. 2015) (holding that the District Court’s instruction of official act properly
limited the illegal acts to the statutory definition).
48 Id at 506.
49 Id at 510.
50 Id. at 516 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)).
51 Id.
52 United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 487 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016),
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); see also Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Will Review Corruption Conviction of
Former Va. Governor Robert McDonnell, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2016)
(https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-will-review-corruption-conviction-of-formerva-governor-robert-mcdonnell/2016/01/15/e281ede0-b3 c8-11e5-a76a-0b5145e8679a_story.html)
53 McDonell, 136 S. Ct. at 2367
47
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to prove an official act the government must: 1) identify some “question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy” involving a formal exercise of governmental power” that is pending
and may be brought before a government official; and 2) prove that the official made a decision or
took action on that matter (or at least agreed to do so). 54 According to the unanimous Court, none
of McDonnell’s actions satisfied this two-part test.55 The Court thus remanded the matter to the
District Court for a retrial of McDonnell under this new, heightened standard .56 Federal
prosecutors in the Eastern District of Virginia chose not to retry the Governor. 57
In creating this standard, the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the official act
requirement to prove quid pro quo scenarios.58 The Court found that “setting up a meeting, talking
to another official, or organizing an event, without more, are not official acts in and of
themselves”.59 Now, an official act became a much more difficult standard to meet. In coming to
this ruling, the Court noted that if McDonnell’s conviction stood, politicians across the country
would live in a state of fear, worried they would go to prison for even the most commonplace
requests for assistance.60 The Court determined that conscientious public officials arrange
meetings for constituents, as well as contact other public officials on their behalf, all the time.61

54

Id.
Id.
56 Id.
57 Matt Zapototosky, Rachel Weiner, and Rosalind Helderman, Prosecutors will drop cases against former Va.
governor Robert McDonnell, wife THE WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2016) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/prosecutors-will-drop-case-against-former-va-gov-robert-mcdonnell/2016/09/08/a19dc50a-6878-11e6-ba325a4bf5aad4fa_story.html
58 SOMETHING MORE: OFFICIAL ACTION AFTER McDONNELL v. UNITED STATES, 67 DePaul L. Rev.
705; See e.g., Chris Cillizza, The Bob McDonnell Supreme Court Ruling Makes Convicting Politicians of
Corruption Almost Impossible, WASH. POST (June 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/thefix/wp/2016/06/27/the-bob-mcdonnell-scotus-ruling-proves-that-its-al most-impossible-to-convict-politicians-ofcorruption/?utm term=.022989fcd793.
59 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.
60 Id at 2365 (determining that “[f]or better or for worse, it puts at risk behavior that is common, particularly when
the quid is a lunch or a basketball ticket, throughout this country).
61 Tara Malloy, Sumposium: Is it Bribery or “The Basic Compact Underlying Representative Government”?
SCTOUSblog (June 28, 2016, 4:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium -is-it-bribery-or-the-basiccompact-underlyingrepresentative-government ("As all Hamilton fans know, it pays to be in "The Room Where It
Happens.' Taken to its logical end, the Court's approach permits officials literally to put "access' up for sale … .")
(analogizing how the concept of access approved or validated by the Court goes beyond a general access).
55
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As the Chief Justice wrote on behalf of the Court: “[t]his case is distasteful; it may be worse than
that. But our concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is instead
with the broader legal implications of the Government's boundless interpretation of the federal
bribery statute.”62
a. The Ramifications of McDonnell v. United States: The Impact on Prosecutions
Moving Forward
It should be noted that before McDonnell was even decided by the Supreme Court, lay and
legal observers were touting its importance. 63 One reason for its significance is that Americans on
both sides of the aisle want to keep corruption out of politics.64 In fact, in a poll commissioned by
the Public Affairs Council, Americans were asked what they hated most about politicians; the
number one answer was political corruption.65 McDonnell’s holding which impacted this hotbutton issue prompted a number of varying responses. Some commentators asserted that
McDonnell opened the door to a corrupt ‘pay to play’ culture” and the “selling [of] political office
for personal gain.”66 Others praised it, declaring that the Court finally rejected “novel prosecution
theories that convert traditional constituent services into federal crimes.” 67

62

Id at 2375.
See, e.g., Harvey Silverglate, Op-Ed, Politics as Usual Often Isn't a Crime, BOS. GLOBE, May 6, 2016,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/05/06/politics-usual-often-isncrime/o2NyNsC0Fq5ZCq6H6pG51K/story.html; George Will, Virginia's Former Governor Faces Prison Over
Politics, Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/viriginias-former-governor-facesprison-over-politics/201601/06/2af3ff74-b3e6-11e5-9388-466021d971de_story.html?utm_term= .8d91fa343d74.
64 John Domen, Here’s what Americans — regardless of party — hate most about politicians WASHINGTON’S TOP
NEWS (Oct. 13, 2019) https://wtop.com/politics/2019/10/new-poll-finds-what-americans-hate-the-most-aboutpoliticians/ (“[N]o. 1 and No. 2 on the list was a lack of political courage and corruption. The scores among
democrats and republicans were almost identical.”)
65 The scores among republicans and democrats were almost identical. Id.
66 Fred Wertheimer, Symposium: McDonnell Decision Substantially Weakens the Government's Ability to Prevent
Corruption and Protect Citizens, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2016, 12:38 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium -mcdonnell-decision-substantially-weakens-the-governmentsbbility-to-prevent- corruption-and-protect-citizens
67 Jeffrey Green & Ivan Dominguez, Symposium: Federal Criminal Statutes Are Not Blank Checks for Prosecutors,
SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2016, 11:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium -federal-criminalstatutes-are-not-blank-checks-for-prosecutors/
63

11

For purposes of this comment, however, the most important criticism comes in the form of
what prosecutions of those politicians engaged in McDonnell-esq behavior will look like moving
forward.68 It is hard to argue that McDonnell does not make prosecuting public figures for political
corruption more difficult. Therefore, one of the most prevalent critiques of the ruling is that
prosecutors will be reluctant to indict corrupt public figures, potentially resulting in more political
corruption throughout the Federal Government. 69 With the adoption of McDonnell, when
prosecutors want to prove someone engaged in domestic bribery, they have a higher hurdle to
clear.70 Many argue that post-McDonnell proving these corruption cases will be close to impossible
because the formalism advocated by the Court ignores what actually occurs in the real world.71
Americans are now left wondering exactly what would count as criminal corruption PostMcDonnell.72 If lower courts extend the McDonnell standard to the other bribery and corruption
statutes it is perhaps true that McDonnell was “one of the best decisions handed down in a long
time for corruption defendants.”73 So, in understanding the impact of McDonnell it is important to

68

Supra Note 65; Brent Kendall, SUPREME COURT'S BOB M CDONNELL RULING COULD AFFECT OTHER CORRUPTION
CASES, Wall St. J. (June 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-courts-bob-mcdonnell-ruling-couldaffect-other-corruption-cases-1467042298
69 Almost 7 out of 10 people believe the government is failing to fight corruption, up from half in 2016.
TRANSPARENCY I NTERNATIONAL (Dec. 12, 2017)
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_in_the_usa_the_difference_a_year_makes; Fred Wertheimer,
Symposium: McDonnell Decision Substantially Weakens the Government's Ability to Prevent Corruption and
Protect Citizens, SCOTUSblog (June 28, 2016, 12:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium mcdonnell-decision-substantially-weakens-the-governments-bbility-to-prevent- corruption-and-protect-citizens
70 PANELS: How Has McDonnell Affected Prosecutors' Ability to Police Public Corruption? What Are Politicians
And Lobbyists Allowed To Do, And What Are Prosecutors Able To Prosecute? 38 Pace L. Rev. 707
71 As discussed, the test of whether something is a bribable official act is whether it is the kind of the activity that
can be put on an agenda, tracked for progress and then checked off as complete. The few politicians who prosecutors
may be able to convict under the official act standard will likely not be careless enough to put together “corruption
to do lists.” Daniel Brovman, QUID PRO NO: WHEN ROLEXES, FERRARIS AND BALL GOWNS ARE NOT POLITICAL
CURRENCY, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 170, 184 (November 2018);
72 After McDonnell it is likely that Federal prosecutors will now bring fewer public corruption cases, knowing a
higher bar must be met. The Court through McDonnell made life easier for corrupt officials everywhere.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-bob-mcdonnell-effect-the-bar-is-getting-higher-toprosecute-public-corruption-cases/2017/07/13/5ac5745c-67e6-11e7-9928-22d00a47778f_story.html (quoting
Randall Eliason, GW Law Professor and Former Federal Prosecutor)
73 Jimmy Vielkind, Silver retrial will test court's notion of 'official act' POLITICO (April 30, 2018) (available at:
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2018/04/30/silver-retrial-will-test-courts-notion-of-officialact-39117)
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consider whether lower courts prescribe the official act standard to other bribery laws and continue
to rebrand corruption.74 These courts’ reading of McDonnell will thus impact how prosecutors are
able to combat domestic bribery both domestically and abroad. 75
IV.

THE APPLICATION OF THE MCDONNELL STANDARD

As of April 4, 2018, McDonnell has been cited 102 times in federal decisions, including by
every federal circuit court, and in nine state court decisions across seven states. 76 Since its
enactment, the Third 77 , Fifth78 , Sixth79 and Eighth Circuits80 all needed to determine if the official
act standard applied to other corruption statutes. All of these courts interpreted the McDonnell
official act standard narrowly.81 In answering these important questions, which will undoubtedly
shape McDonnell’s legacy, the Circuits notably declined to extend the official act standard to other
anti-corruption statutes.82

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, DEREGULATING CORRUPTION, 13 Harvard L. & Pol’y Rev. 471 (2019).
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In fact, there has not been a Circuit Court that has extended the McDonnell official act standard
to another corruption statute outside of 18 U.S.C. § 201, despite the many United States statutes
that require the official act standard.83 Most recently, the Second Circuit was faced with this very
question, only now implicating a new federal corruption statute, one that is likely the most similar
to 18 U.S.C. § 201, but involves foreign actors, rather than United States citizens.84 This statute
is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). 85
a. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Prosecuting Bribery Occurring Abroad
For bribery occurring outside of the United States, to convict someone engaged in illegal
activity, the Department of Justice uses the FCPA. 86 The FCPA was passed by Congress in 1977
as the first law in the world that governed domestic business conduct with foreign government
officials in foreign markets.87 The Department of Justice prosecutes corruption outside of the
United States because given the global nature of the economy. The Department understands that
corruption abroad poses a serious threat to American citizens and companies that are trying to
compete in a fair and transparent marketplace. 88
The FCPA is remarkably similar to 18 U.S.C. § 201.89 First, the two statutes have similar
purposes. The FCPA was enacted for the purpose of making it unlawful for certain classes of
people to make payments to foreign government officials to assist in obtaining or retaining

83

Id.
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business.90 Like 18 U.S.C. § 201, the primary objective of the FCPA is to reduce or eliminate illicit
bribes made by U.S. citizens to foreign officials in order to induce unlawful action.91 Next, the
FCPA is also similar to 18 U.S.C. § 201 because the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA prohibit
individuals from offering or making corrupt payments to foreign government officials for the
purpose of influencing the official in his or her official duties or securing an improper advantage
in order to obtain or retain business.92 This language is remarkably similar to that of 18 U.S.C. §
201, which prohibits almost identical behavior towards United States public officials.
Specifically, The FCPA makes it a crime to corruptly give a foreign official anything of
value for the purposes of: 1) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official
capacity; 2) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful
duty of such official; 3) securing any improper advantage or inducing such foreign official to use
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or
decision of such government or instrumentality. 93 The FCPA requires each of these quos to serve
a particular purpose, meaning they assist the giver in “obtaining,” “retaining,” or “directing”
business.94
For the purposes of this comment, it is important to note the business purpose test portion
of the FCPA. The business purpose test states that the FCPA applies to payments intended to
induce or influence a foreign official to use his position to assist in obtaining or retaining business
for or with, or directing any business to, any person. 95 This provision is broadly interpreted to
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include: (a) winning a contract; (b) influencing the procurement process; (c) circumventing the
rules for importation of products; (d) gaining access to non-public bid tender information; (e)
evading taxes or penalties; (f) influencing the adjudication of lawsuits or enforcement actions; (g)
obtaining exceptions to regulation; and (h) avoiding contract termination.96 For example bribe
payments made to secure favorable tax treatment to reduce or eliminate customs duties, to obtain
government action to prevent competitors from entering a market, or to circumvent a licensing or
permit requirement, all satisfy the business purpose test. 97
In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the business purpose test
in United States v. Kay.98 In Kay, the court held that bribes paid to obtain favorable tax treatment
– which reduced a company’s customs duties and sales taxes on imports could constitute payments
made to obtain or retain business within the meaning of the FCPA. 99 As stated, the congressional
target of the FCPA was to eliminate bribery that was paid to improve the business opportunities
of the payor or his beneficiary. But, like the federal corruption statutes in the United States, some
view bribes as a necessary expense to succeed in a foreign country’s environment, thus criticizing
the business purpose test explained in Kay. These critics argue that the FCPA should not cover
such bribes and the scope of the business purpose test should be construed narrowly if Americans
want to actively compete in another country. 100
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Despite these criticisms, enforcement of FCPA violations has been at an all-time high.101
The FCPA now occupies center stage in the federal government’s war on white-collar crime.102 In
fact, the Department of Justice has increased the number of its FCPA investigations sevenfold
during the last three years.103 That, experts believe, is just the beginning.104 The DOJ has publicly
announced its intention to vigorously enforce the FCPA and has hired an army of new prosecutors
to handle only these types of cases.105 Businesses are mindful of this shift in prosecutorial behavior
towards FCPA violations and have tightened their own internal anticorruption policies in
response.106
While FCPA enforcement is at an all-time high, McDonnell has made it more difficult than
ever to prosecute politicians who are engaged in corrupt practices in our own country. This
dichotomy thus begs the question, will the new vigor in prosecuting FCPA violations be quelled
by McDonnell’s high bar of the official act standard? The Second Circuit was the first court to
answer this question in Seng v. United States. 107
b. Seng v. United States: Narrowing the McDonnell standard
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The Second Circuit recently interpreted the McDonnell official act standard to determine
if it extended to the official act needed in FCPA prosecutions. In United States of America v. NG
Lap Seng the government alleged that the defendant (“Seng”) paid two United Nations officials as
part of a scheme to have the U.N. designate his real estate complex as the permanent site for its
annual convention.108 Specifically, Seng, a Chinese national, sought to develop his already
extensive real estate portfolio into a multi-billion-dollar complex that would include hotels, luxury
apartment buildings and a world-class convention center.109
Seng understood an annual U.N. conference would have broad attendance throughout both
the private and public sectors and if he hosted this conference at his convention center it would
enhance the use and value of the real estate in his new complex.

110

Thus, Seng engaged in a

sustained effort over five years to bribe two U.N. officials: Francis Lorenzo, a U.S. Citizen serving
as the Dominican Republic’s Deputy Ambassador to the U.N. and, John Ashe, who, for the time
during the bribery scheme, was serving as the President of the U.N.’s General Assembly. 111 The
bribing began when Seng and Lorenzo met in March 2009. Soon after meeting, Seng named
Lorenzo President of South-South News, a media organization he owned. 112 Lorenzo would be
paid $20,000 a month to serve as President of South-South News.113 Lorenzo testified at Seng’s
trial that he understood a portion of his salary, as well as many other payments from Seng, were
bribes to secure a commitment for the UN’s use of Seng’s new convention center. 114 In short,
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Lorenzo understood that Mr. Seng was paying him in order to procure an official document from
the United Nations which stated that the convention would be held at his convention center. 115
To prove their case before a Southern District of New York jury, the prosecution argued
that the quid pro quo elements of a Foreign Corrupt Practices violation are not limited to official
acts, as construed by the Supreme Court in McDonnell.116 The government argued that in order to
be guilty of bribery, the U.N. Officials did not need to commit an official act as explained in
McDonnell.117 In fact, all the District Court said the government needed to prove was that Seng
influenced or intended to influence these foreign officials, a standard similar to that of the preMcDonnell era.
Once the District Court made clear that the government did not need to prove Seng engaged
in bribery that led to an official act as under McDonnell the government put on a five-week trial
producing evidence to show that Seng did indeed violate the FCPA.118 The jury convicted Seng
of, among other things, paying and conspiring to pay bribes and gratuities in violation of the
FCPA.119 On appeal, Seng argued that FCPA bribery required proof of an official act to satisfy the
McDonnell standard.120 Seng argued that his jury instructions regarding the FCPA conviction
should have included the official act language described by the Court in McDonnell.121
The Second Circuit declined to extend McDonnell’s “official act” requirement under
Section 201 to the FCPA.122 The court explained that while every bribery statute requires a quid
pro quo, Congress intentionally defined the particular quids and quos differently for each bribery
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statute. Congress defined the quids and quos under the FCPA differently than they did under 18
U.S.C. 201.123 The court determined that it did not need to supplement those Congressionally
codified quos by adding the official act requirement proscribed by McDonnell. 124 In coming to
this decision, the Seng court followed the precedent in United States v. Boyland.125 Similar to the
case at hand, in Boyland, the Court held that the McDonnell standard did not apply to another
corruption statute because this statute was “more expansive than § 201.” 126
With the Boyland principle established, the Second Circuit in Seng continued along a
similar statutory construction argument and held that the FCPA also does not require an official
act to be proven under the McDonnell standard.127 As mentioned, in the FCPA the Second Circuit
found that Congress identifies four specified quos that it wanted criminalized under the FCPA. 128
The first FCPA quo references an “act or decision” of a “foreign official in his official capacity.”
129

The court leaves open the possibility that while this may be understood as an official act, the

FCPA does not force official capacity acts or decisions to a definitional list akin to that for official
acts in 201(a)(3), as interpreted by McDonnell.130 In 18 U.S.C. § 201, for example, the term
“official act” is explicitly defined as a “controversy which may at any time be pending, or which
may be by law brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such
official’s place of trust or profit.”131 In the FCPA, an official act is only states that one violates the
statute when “influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity.” 132
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Under Seng, the court determined that as long as the government has evidence that a party
intended to influence an act or decision of a public official, or to secure an improper advantage for
the party’s company, the Second Circuit determined the prosecution can move forward. There is
no need to prove that the bribee committed an official act, as in McDonnell.133 The implications of
Seng are important. This ruling signals that the government will likely continue to aggressively
pursue FCPA prosecutions, even without evidence that the parties’ conduct influenced official
action.134
V.

ARGUMENT: THE GAP

It is unsurprising that the defendant in Seng argued the more rigid, heightened standard of
McDonnell on appeal, as it seems likely that under the official act standard, Seng would not be
convicted.135 As mentioned, McDonnell’s two-part test requires that the matter before the public
official be a “question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.”136 Merely hosting an event,
meeting with other officials or speaking with interested parties is not an official act. 137 In Seng, the
official act standard would likely not convict Seng, as the U.N. officials’ actions were not “official
enough” to meet the heightened standard.138 The officials merely expressed strong public support
for Seng and set up several meetings for him to move his process forward. All of these activities
the Court in McDonnell held did not constitute an official act.139
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So under McDonnell, a governor can demand that you pay him to promote a drug company’s
newest product.140 But, on the other hand, after Seng, under the FCPA it seems that any American
who engages in such practices abroad would likely be convicted, if charged. 141 The discrepancy is
hard to ignore and seems to be a largely ignored consequence of the heightened McDonnell
standard. Therefore, to further prove that this sort of corruption that occurs abroad is legal in our
own country, the comment will conclude by exploring actions and real-world examples that are
likely to be deemed acceptable under McDonnell, while potentially exposing the actors to liability
under the FCPA, like the actions stated above in Seng.
a. Methodology
To determine if the FCPA prohibits more conduct abroad than the laws which govern our
own politicians, this comment explores a small sampling of cases in which charges were dropped
or lessened thanks to the heighted McDonnell standard. This comment will address three cases it
will use as case studies. In each case, it will analyze only the precise charges that are likely not to
fulfil the McDonnell official act standard. Only these charges are considered because preMcDonnell these same public officials could have been convicted or changed for their actions.
Now, such activities are suddenly deemed acceptable because they do not constitute an official
act. Therefore, once those charges are determined, this comment will analyze each unique action,
asking if the activity would constitute a crime under the FCPA, if it had involved a foreign official.
Since foreign officials are generally not able to be prosecuted in the United States,142 for
argument’s sake this comment will hypothetically place the convicted politician as the foreign
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official who is receiving bribes. Similarly, the issuer of the bribe would be the American citizen
who is attempting to advance his cause abroad. While not perfect, the overall hypothesis remains
the same: conduct in the United States that is deemed legal is criminalized for being committed
abroad. This section therefore looks to address whether someone could engage in conduct with a
politician in the United States, and not get convicted under McDonnell, but then engage in the
same conduct with a foreign official in another country and be convicted under the FCPA.143 It
seems that the answer is a resounding yes.
b. Case Study No. 1: Actions Similar to those that Occurred in McDonnell v. United
States
First, there the activity at issue in McDonnell. As discussed previously and in McDonnell,
Governor McDonnell received approximately $175,000 in loans, gifts and other benefits from a
wealthy Virginia-businessman who was attempting to launch his new business, and wanted the
then-Governor to help him.144 Specifically, Williams, asked McDonnell for help attaining research
to show his drug’s health benefits.145 But, Virginia’s public universities could only perform the
requested testing if they received state grants, which were controlled by McDonnell. 146 So, in
exchange for lavish gifts, McDonnell agreed to introduce Williams to Virginia’s Secretary of
Health and Human Resources. A few months later, McDonnell’s wife suggested Williams sit next
to her husband at a rally, in which Williams bought her $20,000 worth of designer clothing as a
thank you.147 Williams then gave the McDonnells $65,000, in return for which the Governor set
up more meetings for Williams to interact with state agencies in hopes that one of these agencies
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would agree to do the research Williams was looking for. 148 At Mrs. McDonnell’s suggestion,
Williams also purchased the governor a Rolex watch. 149
Finally, in August 2011, Governor McDonnell held a lunch at the Governor’s mansion with
university researchers to help launch William’s new drug. 150 After this lunch, the McDonnells
asked for another $50,000 loan.151 Before giving the loan, however, Williams complained about
the lack of progress in getting the necessary research. Taking matters into her own hands, Mrs.
McDonnell emailed the Governor’s counsel to express her husband’s desire to “get this thing
going” and Governor McDonnell held yet another reception for researchers. 152
While the Supreme Court’s decision suggested these acts might not be prosecutable, similar
conduct would very likely raise red flags under the FCPA. Hypothetically, if McDonnell were a
foreign actor and Williams were a U.S. citizen, Williams could have been charged with violating
the FCPA. Under the FCPA, Williams could have been indicted for paying McDonnell in exchange
for trying to get McDonnell to use his status as a politician to help get his company launched.
To prove a violation of the FCPA the government must prove intent. 153 The FCPA's antibribery provisions criminalize the transfer of money or other gifts to foreign officials and political
actors with the intent to influence or obtain or retain business. 154 Therefore, to violate the FCPA,
a defendant must possess the requisite mens rea, which is satisfied when acts are "knowing[ly],"
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"corruptly," or "willfully," committed.155 The FCPA defines a "knowing" state of mind as one in
which the person is aware that he is engaging in illegal conduct, or is aware or has a firm belief
that an illegal circumstance or result exists or is "substantially certain to occur."156 The intent is
proven in Williams’ trial testimony where he testified that the only reason he showered the first
couple of Virginia with gifts was because he believed it would pay dividends to his company Star
Scientific.157
Additionally, William’s conduct would satisfy the other elements of the anti-bribery
provisions under the FCPA. As mentioned, the business purpose test states that the FCPA applies
to payments intended to induce or influence a foreign official to use his position to assist in
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing any business to, any person. 158 The
payments from Williams were just that, intended to induce or influence McDonnell [in this case,
a foreign official] to use his position in order to assist Williams in obtaining or retaining business
for or with any person. In this the researchers the governor had access to would the business
Williams was looking to gain by bribing the governor. Further proving that Williams could have
potentially been indicted for such behavior under the FCPA, the business purpose test is interpreted
broadly.
c. Case Study No. 2: Actions Similar to those in the United States v. Jefferson –
“Talking to other officials”

155

Although the FCPA does not define the term "corruptly," the Senate Report for the statute states that "[t]he word
'corruptly' connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to wrongfully influence the recipient." S. REP. NO. 95-114,
at 10 (1977); 15 U.S.C § 78dd-1(a), (g)(1) (2012) (for issuers)
156 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A) (for issuers)
157 “I expected what had already happened, that he would continue to help me move this product forward in
Virginia.” IV.JA.2355.
158 The United States Department of Justice Criminal Resources Manual, BRIBERY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
(available at: https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-2041-bribery-public-officials )

25

Another example of conduct that would likely be deemed acceptable under McDonnell but
would be potentially criminal under the FCPA are those actions described in Jefferson v. United
States.159 William Jefferson was a nine-time Democratic congressman from Louisiana who was
convicted on 16 charges related to business dealings in Africa. 160 In Jefferson, among other
dealings, Jefferson famously hid $90K in his freezer for the vice president of Nigeria. 161 Jefferson
was sentenced to 13 years in prison after a jury convicted him of corruption charges in 2009.162
However, soon after McDonnell, a judge ruled that in light of the Supreme Court’s McDonnell
decision, not all of Jefferson’s behavior rose to the level of public corruption defined by the high
court.163 The court in Jefferson held that much of the evidence presented at trial did not support a
finding that Jefferson engaged in official acts that rose to the level necessary to be convicted under
the heightened McDonnell standard.164 In fact, the Court held that his conviction for seven of the
counts were erroneous under the new McDonnell standard.165 These dropped convictions,
however, are troubling and violate the FCPA had they involved a foreign official rather than a
United States Congressman.
For example, in the longest running scheme, the “iGATE Technology scheme”, Jefferson
solicited money from the President of this technology company in exchange for his promotion of
iGATE’s technology to the Army and various West African countries. 166 iGATE Technology was
a company that was looking to break into the military market, as well as several countries in West
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Africa. The President of iGATE knew that Jefferson would be exposed to these officials because
he was a Congressman. Therefore, the President of iGATE capitalized on this opportunity and
decided to pay Jefferson to help him promote his business.167 First, Jefferson met with several
generals at his office to discuss the possible testing of iGATE technology at different military
bases.168 It should be noted that Jefferson arranged this meeting only after the President of iGATE
reached out and asked for his assistance because at the time, iGATE was paying Jefferson to use
his position to promote the technology.169 Similarly, Jefferson met with a number of high ranking
West African government officials and business people in hopes of promoting this iGATE
technology he was being paid to indorse.170 During all of these meetings, Jefferson made several
encouraging statements about iGATE’s technology, encouraging the military personnel and West
African leaders to purchase it.171
But the District Court found that these trips did not constitute official acts. 172 The District
Court held that because the government did not prove Jefferson did more to exert pressure on those
he was securing the meetings up, no official act was committed. The court stated that “[a]greeing
to set up meetings to provide constituents with information and expressing support for a project
are not official acts and do not amount to the requisite "pressure" for criminal liability under
McDonnell.”173 In addition, the court determined that while the decision to lead a private trade
delegation did require Jefferson to disclose his activities to the House Ethics Committee and he
did travel in capacity as Congressman, “leading a private trade delegation appears to be closer to
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holding a dinner at the Governor’s mansion as occurred in McDonnell than ‘something in the
nature of a lawsuit.’”174
The District Court made clear that much of what Jefferson was originally accused of did
not meet the official act standard proscribed under McDonnell yet this very same conduct could
violate the FCPA. h
d. Case Study No. 3: Actions Similar to those in United States v. Silver – Setting Up
an Event
In 2015, the Government indicted Sheldon Silver on charges of honest services fraud,
Hobbs Act extortion and money laundering. 175 In Silver, the government accused Silver, who was
serving as speaker of the New York Assembly, of trading favors for legal fees. 176 In particular, the
Government alleged that Silver abused his public position by engaging in two quid pro quo
schemes in which he performed official acts in exchange for bribes and kickbacks. 177 Each scheme
had the same premise: in exchange for Silver’s actions as speaker he would receive bribes and
kickbacks in the form of referral fees from third -party law firms.178
In the first scheme, Silver became “of counsel” for a law firm, which maintained an active
personal injury practice.179 Despite not doing any actual legal work, Silver received a salary and
any referral fees for any cases he brought into the Firm. 180 Silver asked an acquittance of his, Dr.
Robert Taub, to begin referring patients to him for legal representation.181 Taub was hoping to
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secure a relationship with Silver that would help him receive researching funding. 182 Although
unaware of the specifics of the financial arrangement between Silver and the law firm, Dr. Taub
testified that he believed Silver would benefit personally from the referrals he would send and he
kept sending those referrals in hopes that Silver would help him attain research funding. 183 After
receiving several referrals and several referral fees from Taub, Silver soon invit ed Dr. Taub to
attend the State of the State ceremony at the New York State capitol. 184 He then put Dr. Taub in
touch with one his staffers to discuss the status of Dr. Taub’s grant request. 185 Eventually Silver
secured two $250,000 state grants to support Dr. Taub's research.186
The second scheme the government alleged Silver took part in involved two New York
real estate developers, both of whom depended heavily on favorable state legislation. As Speaker,
Silver had considerable control over legislation. Silver convinced the developers to move their tax
work to another law firm Silver worked with and received referral fees from. 187 Both developers
testified that they gave their tax work to the firm Silver requested because they wanted to influence
Silver’s legislative work concerning real estate. 188 In total, over a period of about 18 years Silver
received approximately $835,000 in fees from each law firm from his referral of the developers.189
In return for the kickbacks, Silver took a number of actions, both official and not, to benefit
the developers. For example, Silver repeatedly voted as one of three members to approve the
developers’ requests for tax-exempt financing for many of its projects. 190 He also publicly opposed
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the relocation of a methadone clinic that would be located near one of the developer’s rental
buildings.191
Unsurprisingly, a jury found Silver guilty on all counts. 192 He was sentenced to twelve
years in prison.193 After he was convicted, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
McDonnell.194 Silver then appealed his judgment of conviction and argued that the District Court’s
jury instructions are erroneous under McDonnell.195 The Second Circuit agreed with Silver and
held that the District Court’s instructions did not comport with the new McDonnell standard.196
Particularly, the Second Circuit determined that what prosecutors said counted as an
official act in the jury trial was too broad. 197 They determined that while the Government certainly
did present evidence of acts that remain “official” under McDonnell the jury may have convicted
Silver for conduct that also does not constitute an official act and is thus lawful. 198 The Second
Circuit broke down what would and would not be an official act under the new McDonnell
standard, creating a road-map for what prosecutors should attempt to convict Silver of in the new
trial. For example, as discussed, after Silver started receiving referrals from Dr. Taub, Silver
invited Dr. Taub to attend the State of the State ceremony at the New York State Capitol where he
then put Dr. Taub in touch with one of his staffers to discuss the status of the doctor’s grant request.
The Second Circuit determined that this conduct would not be considered an official act because
Silver was merely setting up meetings, which McDonnell explicitly allowed.199 Therefore, the
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prosecutors chose not to retry it. This same conduct would, however, be likely problematic under
the FCPA because Dr. Taub was using Silver to get into important rooms and then was put in touch
about his grant request.200 These invitations and introductions only occurred after Taub made it
clear he would send Silver referrals and would likely satisfy the FCPA’s business purpose test.
This conduct would satisfy the business purpose test because Taub recognized the only reason he
sent these referrals to Silver’s firm was because he wanted Silver to act in his official capacity.
In addition, the court concluded that Silver’s opposition to a methadone clinic may not
have been an official act. While a rational jury could have found that this opposition was an official
act, it seems unlikely. The only action Silver took regarding the clinic was to draft a letter to be
distributed publicly that expressed his strong opposition to the clinic. The Court in McDonnell held
that taking a public position on an issue, by itself, is not a formal exercise of governmental power,
and is therefore not an official act under McDonnell.201 However, if Silver was a foreign official
and American businessmen in his country were giving him payments to write letters on official
letterhead, it seems almost certain that these businessmen could be prosecutable under the FCPA
because they were bribing an official to use his position for an improper purpose.
VI.

CONCLUSION

To say the least, it is concerning that actions our own Supreme Court have deemed legal in the
United States could lead to criminal liability if committed on foreign soil. Had the Second Circuit
extended McDonnell to the FCPA however, prosecuting corruption abroad, would be just as
difficult, if not more difficult than it is domestically now thanks to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
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McDonnell. To address this gap, the legislature should re-draft 18 U.S.C. § 201, to conform it with
the standards of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
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